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CASE COMMENTS
should persist until the jury are convinced that facts are shown
from which reasonable minds could find against the existence of
the presumed facts. If the assumed fact is rebutted then it should,
just as in the case of an "inference, disappear. The "presumption"
should function only as a procedural ,device of going forward with
the evidence which would dictate a decision only where there is an
entire lack of competent evidence to contradict it, but the inoment
substantial, countervailing evidence appears from any source, the
presumption should cease to have any function. The presumption
should merely shift the burden of going forward with the evidence
but should not shift the burden of persuasion.
3. The court should in every case avoid the use of the term
"conclusive presumption". If the end accomplished is no more than
to declare a rule of substantive law, which is beyond the province
of the trier, then it should not be reached through the fiction of
presumption, but rather by way of a positive statement by the court
declaring or preserving a substantive common law rule.
J. L. R.
CASE COMMENTS
CoNsTroNAL LAW-DUE PRocEss-EvmENcE OF PmoR CON-
vicnoN.-D was convicted of first degree murder in the state court
and sentenced to death. Under Pennsylvania law, the jury has the
duty of determining the penalty when they find a defendant guilty
of first degree murder. The court allowed the admission of evi-
dence of a prior conviction, instructing the jury that such evi-
dence was to be used solely for the purpose of assessing the penalty.
This evidence was allowed before the jury determined the guilt or
innocence of D. D contends that the introduction of such evidence
before the verdict on the theory that the jury will disregard this
knowledge in determining his guilt, and yet use it later in deter-
mining his penalty is a denial of due process under the fourteenth
amendment. Held, that the fourteenth amendment guarantees no
particular form of procedure in state criminal trials, and the states
should have the widest latitude in administering their own systems
of justice; consequently, Pennsylvania procedure, permitting the
introduction of prior convictions for the sole purpose of enabling the
jury to assess the proper penalty, did not deprive D of due process
of law. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 258 F.2d 918 (3d
Cir. 1958).
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The basis of this decision is to be found in PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4701 (1950), which places the duty of assessing the penalty
on the jury where the defendant is found guilty of first degree
murder. In Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 AU. 904
(1928), 'the Pennsylvania court interpreted the statute to permit
the admission of evidence of prior convictions solely for the purpose
of enabling the jury, after it had found the accused guilty, to
assess the penalty.
The overwhelming weight of authority throughout the coun-
try, follows the doctrine that, in a criminal prosecution, proof which
shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of the commis-
sion of other crimes and offenses at other times, even though they
are of the same nature as the one charged in the indictment, is
incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the com-
mission of the particular crime charged. Smith v. State, 195 Wis.
555,218 N.W. 822 (1928); People v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, 65 N.W.
203 (1895); State v. Garney, 45 Idaho 768, 265 Pac. 668 (1928).
There are certain exceptions to the doctrine: (1) when such evi-
dence tends directly to establish the particular crime, Pittman v.
State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385 (1906); (2) to prove the motive, the
intent, or the absence of mistake or accident, People v. Northcott,
209 Cal. 639, 289 Pac. 634 (1980); (3) as proof of the identity
of the accused, Mitchell v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 So. 76 (1904).
The West Virginia law on this problem was decided early in
Watts v. State, 5 W. Va. 582 (1872), where the court held that
"evidence of a distinct, substantive offense cannot be admitted in
support of another offense." This doctrine has been modified some-
what since that early date. Thus in State v. Moubray, 139 W. Va.
535, 81 S.E.2d 117 (1954), the court recognized the Watts doctrine,
but stated one exception, allowing admission of evidence of a prior
offense to show motive or intent if such other offense is similar and
near in time to, has some logical connection with, and tends to
establish the commission of the specific offense charged, and indi-
cates that the specific offense is part of a system of criminal action.
Such evidence is also admissible to show the bad character of the
defendant where he has sought to establish his own good character.
State v. Miller, 75 W. Va. 591, 84 S.E. 83 (1915). Prior to 1943, the
use of evidence of prior convictions was likewise permissible as a
basis for additional penalty, but it was an absolute necessity that it
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be properly charged in the indictanent so as to acquaint the accused
of the charge he must be prepared to defend. If admitted when
not properly charged in the indictment, there was a strong presump-
tion that such evidence was prejudicial. State v. Royal, 94 W. Va.
617, 119 S.E. 801 (1928). The undesirable result of this case was
changed in 1943. W. V.A. CoDE ch. 61, art. 11, § § 18, 19 (Michie
1955), provides for admission of prior convictions for determining
additional penalty after conviction of the particular offense charged.
It is submitted that this procedure is most desirable in that the
verdict of the jury is in no way swayed by the past conduct of the
defendant.
Considering the constitutional question, in Anderson v. State,
8 Okla. Grim. 90, 91, 126 Pac. 840 (1912), the court made the fol-
lowing observations: "In criminal cases in a state court, due process
of law means a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, before an
impartial judge and jury, or judge without a jury, upon an accusa-
tion, either by indictment or information, as the state may provide,
charging the accused with the violation of some state law, of which
accusation the accused must have notice in time to enable him to
prepare for trial. This trial must proceed according to the estab-
lished procedure or rules of practice in such state applicable to all
such cases. In other words, the defendant must have his day in
court. The admission of evidence for or against the accused must
be according to the established rules in such state in all such cases,
and the punishment inflicted must be authorized by law."
In the principal case, the admission of evidence of prior con-
victions is based on state procedure which was established over
thirty years prior to the decision, although contrary to the common
law doctrine that such evidence is inadmissible. It is submitted
that an established rule founded on unsound reason and logic should
be given no greater consideration in questions of due process of
law than one recently promulgated. In Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 488 (1954), the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized that a man may be deprived of his constitutional guar-
antees by a so called "established practice." It would appear that
the admission of evidence of a prior conviction would certainly lead
a reasonably prudent man to look with disfavor on the accused,
thus the impartial jury guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is
dispensed with, despite instructions that the evidence is to be used
for the sole purpose of determining the penalty. In United States
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ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 79 Sup. Ct. 295 (1958), the defendant
in the principal case was denied certiorari, but no reasons for the
denial were given. Therefore, it is not known if the Pennsylvania
practice has been sanctioned or condemned.
J. F. W., Jr.
CONsTrTrtmrONAL LAw-FREmom OF THE PEmss-TEsTmONY PFW-
ILEGE OF JouENALiST.-P brought action against broadcasting com-
pany for allegedly false and defamatory statements made about
her by a "network executive" and published by defendant news-
paper columnist. The district court held defendant in criminal
contempt for refusing to testify to the identity of the "network
executive" who was indicated to be the source of the allegedly
defamatory statement in her column. Defendant, claiming this to
be a confidential communication, appealed. Held, that the first
amendment, guaranteeing freedom of the press, does not confer an
evidentiay privilege on a journalist to refuse to identify the source
of an allegedly defamatory statement. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1958).
The claim of the defendant in this case of a privilege from
testifying as to the source of her publication presents a twofold
problem. The two legal theories on which the defendant claimed
such a privilege in the principal case are those most frequently
proposed in cases of this nature. They are: (1) the guarantee of
freedom of the press contained in the first amendment; and (2) a
privilege from testifying as a rule of evidence.
The contention with which the court was most concerned in
the resolution of the principal case was the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of the press. On this ground, there seems little doubt
that the court accurately and soundly applied the law. The guar-
antees of the constitution are liberally applied, and broad scope is
given to them. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950). Authors
and publishers are entitled to a high degree of protection from ac-
countability for their publications. Baure v. Secretary of Common-
wealth, 820 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946). But it has long been
recognized that freedom of the press is not an absolute free-
dom. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). It is primarily
a freedom from prior restraint. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
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